Unpopular, but Necessary Nuance: China, U.S. Hegemony, and the Exploitation of Uyghurs and Other Minorities
In its efforts to maintain global hegemony, the U.S. has a long, sordid history of using Islamic radicals and exploiting human rights issues to further its aims. But China isn't entirely innocent.
One of the hazards of today’s increasingly polarized discourse is daring to have a nuanced view of geopolitics, especially with regards to nations targeted by the U.S. empire for overthrow. Given the incessant demonization of the United States’ enemies, getting at the truth can be incredibly difficult. Even more daunting is trying to share what one manages to find with those who are steadfastly opposed to U.S. empire and are therefore inclined to ignore, deny, or downplay shortcomings within the targeted nations.
It is understandable to dismiss the lies of U.S. politicians for what they are, and indeed, everyone should absolutely have as the default understanding that whatever a Western politician says is probably a lie unless independently verified evidence shows otherwise.
Credible left-leaning jouranlists including Danny Haiphong, Benjamin Norton, and Li Jingjing, among others, have done a lot of great work debunking Western imperial deceptions regarding China. They go out of their way to cut through the spin to get at the truth, and they demonstrate a healthy degree of skepticism toward Western narratives.
The problem is that there are different types of lies: lies of omission, lies of exaggeration, and outright fabrication. Simply because Western elites lie by way of exaggeration doesn’t mean there isn’t a grain of truth embedded in the falsehoods in order to make them seem credible.
Such is the case with China and its treatement of certain marginalized communities. The U.S. empire and its vassal states tell lies of fabrication, such as with the origins of COVID 19, but many other lies are of exaggeration—in particular with regards to the Xinjiang region and Uygurs, but also with regards to how China treats LGBTQIA citizens and other marginalized groups.
To begin with, a disclaimer should be made so you know exactly what I’m trying to do here:
This entry will go into some detail about the nuances of Western lies told about China, how China responds to external threats in part by cracking down on internal dissent, Western exploitation of various groups in its agenda to topple Beijing, and I will try to sort out the truth from all the spin. Simply because the West lies about a nation targeted for overthrow doesn’t mean one should accept at face value the denials of that targeted nation. As always when maintaining a skeptical mindset, one must be vigilant against propaganda from all sides. I will address the falsehoods told by the West, but also point out the very real issues within China. Simply because I explain why I think Beijing has done and continues to certain things, that does not mean I necessarily condone or condemn it. This entry will try as best it can to be dispassionate in its approach. Those wishing to pigeon-hole me into a pro- or anti-China category may cry salty tears.
UYGHURS MUSLIMS
First things first: no, China categorically is not carrying out a genocide of Uygar Muslims in Xinjiang Province. That accusation is utter bullshit and always has been, and I have sources who can testify to that through their own experiences. That does not, however, mean that Uygars are treated fairly by the national government—far from it. In order to get at the truth, first we must go into the history of Islam in China, the Uygar people, and their place in Chinese society.
The Handbook on Ethnic Minorities in China, edited by Xiaowei Zang of the College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences at the City University of Hong Kong, is at 537 pages quite a slog to get through, so for the purposes of this entry I will focus primarily on Chapter Four, which begins around page sixty. Islam in China goes back 1,300 years, with Christians arriving in greater numbers during the seventeenth century, causing, according to my sources, far more trouble in the empire than did Muslims.
“Xinjiang is deemed by the Chinese government to be not a province but, since 1 October 1955, an Autonomous Region in deference to the non-Han, that is non-Chinese population.”1 Uygars tend to reject the name Xinjiang for their region, preferring to call it Eastern Turkestan; other local designations include Uyghuristan and Sharqi Turkistan. Militant independence groups in the region have existed since at least the eighteenth century. (Zang 2016, 60-61)
Manichaeism, an offshoot of Zoroastrianism, has influenced not only Uygar religious beliefs and cultural practices, but may have indirectly impacted the development of Sufism. (Zang 2016, 63-64)
(In fact, Uygar Muslims are much more open-minded and tolerant toward LGBTQIA persons than other Islamic sects, allow female imams, and shun the wearing of veils, which is unheard of in many predominantly Muslim nations such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. I’ll come back to this later, but I wanted to give a general idea of Uygar Muslim attitudes and beliefs.)
Islam arrived in the region following the twelfth century, brought first by Sufi missionaries and later via conquest by Eastern Turkestan warlords who had converted to Sufism. (Zang 2016, 64)
The present conflict between Uygars and Beijong may be traced back to the early twentieth century, specifically, the Republican Period when China was dominated by the Nationalist Guomindang, whose rule was enforced in Xinjiang by warlords.
two short-lived but influential opposition regimes in Xinjiang. The first of these was the Turkic Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan, which was established in Kashgar in 1933–34 by Uyghurs but only lasted a few months. The second was the Eastern Turkestan Republic that was created in the northwest of Xinjiang in the three districts of Ili, Tarbagahtai and Altai. It was more enduring than the Kashgar regime and lasted from 1944–49: it was also more multi-ethnic and secular nationalist and less Islamic. (Zang 2016, 66)
But the fierce drive toward independence goes back centuries, and the history of the Uygars often runs parallel to—and overlaps with—China itself. Things did not change as the twentieth century wore on. When the Nationalists were overthrown by the Communists in 1949, clashes between the Uygars and the Communist Party of China (CPC) during the 1950s and 1960s exacerbated tensions, which Western powers, especially the United States of America, sought to exploit both directly and indirectly.
Through proxies such as Saudi Arabia, the U.S. has long tried to destabilize Chinese Communist rule via radicalization.
As a relatively modern phenomenon building on the Sunni orthodox revivals of the 18th century, the failures of traditional Muslim authorities to contend with mounting internal and external challenges, as well as the spread of new modernistic discourses, Salafism found a popular following across many Muslim societies in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Its growth was facilitated by Saudi Arabia – which embraced its own idiosyncratic brand of Salafism rooted in the mid-18th century religious revivalism that swept central Arabia (usually denoted by its detractors as Wahhabism after its “founder” Mohammed bin Abdul Wahhab) – especially after its annexation of Mecca and Medina in 1924-25, and the subsequent influx of oil wealth, which endowed the country with the religious authority and means (universities, charities, organizations, preachers, and communicative mediums) to promote this current globally.
Among China’s Hui ethnic group, Saudi-influenced Salafism has been present for nearly a century. Aside from the intellectual residue influencing other sects and currents, its most obvious manifestation is to be found in the Salafi sect, which constitutes a small minority within the community of the faithful in China. Concentrated in small clusters across the Northwest and Yunnan, and identified by their “Saudi” clothes, Salafis have elicited fear and opposition from their ideological opponents within the wider Chinese Muslim community, leading at times to outright sectarian conflict.2
The proliferation of Wahhabism beginning in 1849, along with Salafist influence, has had a radicalizing effect on Some of China’s Muslims, including the Uygars.
In China, the fight for the independence of Xinjiang was spearheaded by Uighur nationalists in the centre and north and Uighur Salafists in the southwest. Gradually, with influence from the bordering South and Central Asia and support from the distant Middle East and Europe, the entire movement assumed a Salafist orientation. Despite efforts by Beijing and Xinjiang governments to dismantle the underground Salafi infrastructure, ideological and operational threat persisted and grew. Although a Uighur militant infrastructure survive in Xinjiang, the sustained pressure to dismantle the group led many like Mahsum to flee China. They reorganized themselves in Munich, Dubai, and in Peshawar in the 1980s and 1990s with support from governmental, non governmental, community, and crime.
As the Turks and segments of the Turkish government considered Uighurs as Turkic, they actively and tacitly supported unity moves by the divided Uighur migrant and diaspora organizations. Driven by the breakup of the Soviet empire and rise of Central Asian states, Turkey wished to expand its influence from Turkey through Central Asia to Xinjiang. The Uighur elite organized the first Uighur National Congress in Istanbul in December 1992. While Turkey remained a key centre, political activity expanded to Germany, fundraising emerged in the Gulf and militant activity in Pakistan spread to Afghanistan.
The attacks and protests in Xinjiang have continued from a series of bus bombings in 1992 and demonstration against Chinese nuclear testing at Lop Nor resulting in clashes with security forces and the destruction of military equipment. In addition to blaming Hizbul Islam Li-Turkistan Ash-Sharqiyah Beijing attributed attacks in Xinjiang to new groups such as the Eastern Turkistan Youths League and the World Uighur Youth Congress. Although the ideology of Uighur nationalism remains intact, the threat posed by the ethno-nationalist groups diminished and the threat posed by politico-religious groups grew. The Salafist strain of Jihadism and Takfirism grew in the prison throughout the second half of the 1990s and through the contact of Uighur migrant and diaspora communities with al Qaeda and Taliban. (“Salafism in China and Its Jihadist-Takfiri Strains” 2018)
Needless to say, many Chinese Muslims, including Uygars, have gone from liberal-minded to extremely conservative, with male heads of households adopting a much more Wahabbist attitude toward women and girls. As it relates to tensions between Uygars and Beijing, the influence of Islamist radicals is the proverbial throwing of gasoline on the fire.
“With the spread of Salafist-Jihadist-Takfiri ideology, the terrorist threat to China continues to grow. Inspired and instigated, TIP sustained its effort of terrorist attacks against China both in Xinjiang and beyond. They included suicide and suicidal attacks.”34 Beijing’s response to these external and internal forces against its rule is to come down hard—and I do mean hard.
In 2016 Beijing began restricting the movements of Uyghurs by recalling their passports, effectively denying them the ability to leave China. “A call to an immigration officer in Shihezi PSB confirmed the policy on October 26. Calls to seven immigration offices in various locations across Xinjiang – Fukang City, Karamay City, Korla City, Tacheng Prefecture, Manas County, Aksu Prefecture, and Karakax County – between October 27 and November 2 also confirmed the policy.”5 The effect of these restrictions, although nominally to prevent anti-communist dissidents from leaving the country to participate in C.I.A. and other Western intelligence agency training, in practical terms it has resulted in increased resentment of government actions, both because of the restrictions themselves and the perceived inconsistencies in enforcement.
The passport policy does not seem to have been applied consistently across Xinjiang. The explanatory note issued by the Shihezi immigration office states that those who reside abroad with valid long-term foreign visas are not required to hand in their passports. Other officers said individuals should “wait for phone calls from the local police stations” before handing them in. In Tacheng Prefecture, the officer said they would consider exceptions such as impending travel; in a follow-up call on November 2, an officer in the same office said the recall had not yet taken place.6
Restrictions on movement aren’t limited to travel outside the country. My source tells me that even when traveling within China, hotels and other establishments are required to report to local authorities whenever a Uyghur comes to visit, thus imposing an atmosphere of perpetual surveillance.
Tibetans and members of the mostly Muslim Uyghur ethnic group have been placed on a security blacklist when they seek hotel rooms in major Chinese cities, with staff informing local police stations when they try to check in, sources told RFA on Thursday.
An employee who answered the phone at a Beijing branch of the homegrown Homeinns hotel chains confirmed that the hotel would take special action if Tibetans checked in.
"We would inform the local police station, that's all," the employee of the Ganlu Yuan branch of Homeinns in Beijing's Chaoyang district said.
"But there wouldn't be a problem as long as they have their ID card."
Meanwhile, an employee who answered the phone at the Hanting Hotel in Beijing's Haidian district said special measures are also in place for the mostly Muslim, Turkic-speaking Uyghur ethnic group from the northwestern region of Xinjiang.
"Uyghurs can book rooms, but the police will pay a visit," the employee said. "As soon as they register, it will all go through on the system."7
Now, bear in mind that while the claims of restrictions on movement are undoubtedly ridiculously exaggerated by Western N.G.O.s and politicians, there is at least some truth in that it is primarily (if not only) those Uyghurs and Tibetans whose persons or families have been linked to extremist radicals who have found their movements restricted both within China and outside its borders.8 This is to be expected, as Beijing quite understandably does not want Muslim extremists being able to move about freely trying to stir up violence against the communist government.* If your government had to content with foreign intelligence agencies exploiting dissidents within your country’s borders so as to foment violent separatist movements, you’d be sure to monitor their activities closely as well. And you certainly don’t want defectors going abroad becoming the next Yeonmi Park to spread ridiculously obvious lies that are nevertheless gobbled up by Westerners eager to believe the worst about China and its communist government.
Chinese authorities don’t exactly round up Uyghurs or Tibetans en masse or place them into concentration camps, but there are re-education centers in which offending dissidents are confined and made to do menial tasks such as making party buttons while endlessly reciting party slogans. This is intended to wear down the offender’s psyche until he or she basically gives up radical activities just to escape the tedium. As well, authorities are not above targeting trouble-makers’ families for imprisonment as a way to ensure they don’t re-offend.
The point of explaining all this is not to try to take one side or another in the situation regarding Uyghur Muslims and Tibetans in China, rather, it is to provide important context so that readers may reach an understanding as to how and why Beijing has adopted what policies it has taken toward these ethnic groups. Although it is wholly dishonest to claim with a straight face that China has been carrying out a genocide of Uyghurs or suppressing culture, languages, and religious practices, it is equally as dishonest to assume that Beijing has not taken steps—sometimes harsher than necessary and casting a wider net than is needed—in order to crack down on anti-government activities, and that some of those steps may be contributing to further radicalization.
Complicating matters is the attitude of Han Chinese toward Uyghurs, stemming from the policy Beijing has implemented with respect to that ethnic group.
The policy has been a source of contention since its promulgation. Supporters of the policy argue that it embodies the government’s deep respect towards China's diverse population and upholds the ideal of “ethnic unity.” Critics of the policy have become increasingly vocal following a spate of violent attacks involving Uyghurs on Han Chinese targets after 2009. They argue that the policy runs counter to the principle of equality before the law. Preferential treatment towards ethnic minorities stokes anger within a large segment of China’s Han population. Many Han Chinese claim to have experienced discrimination because of prejudicial law enforcement, or because ethnic minorities have been exempt from strict policies restricting family size and have easier access to tertiary education and lower business taxation rates – many of which are legacies from reformer Hu.9
It gets even more complicated:
Policy makers in the 1980s might not have foreseen the complex problems brought about by the increase in inter-ethnic contact in the subsequent decades, resulting from the mass migration of Han Chinese to traditionally minority regions in China’s interior. Eastward migration to traditionally Han Chinese cities by ethnic minorities on the lookout for better job opportunities, albeit on a smaller scale, has also contributed to the surge of inter-ethnic conflicts. Although the arguments against liangshao yikuan are not entirely without grounds, recent public discussions reveal the rise of Han chauvinism in both physical and virtual spaces. While stressing that preferential policies for ethnic minorities violate the right to equality, many critics fail to realize that ethnic minorities today face discrimination in many other respects. For instance, Tibetans and Uyghurs are placed on a security blacklist when they seek accommodations in major cities. Their right to travel both internationally and abroad is severely restricted because their passports have been seized in a bid to tighten control over their movements.
While Han Chinese widely believe that liangshao yikuan has contributed to an increase in petty crimes by ethnic minorities, some critics believe that the policy’s negative effect has been exaggerated. A 2010 article originally posted on a website founded by Ilham Tohti, www.uighur.biz.net (no longer valid), claimed that the problem of Uyghur petty thieves is chiefly caused both by the lack of social mobility among Uyghurs and the criminal policy that exempts children under the age of 14 from criminal liability, rather than liangshao yikuan. The age of criminal responsibility has likewise benefited many Han Chinese juvenile offenders. Prominent Tibetan blogger Woeser has written that the policy of restraints and leniency has virtually no effect on political cases.
Woeser’s argument is in line with Dui Hua’s observation that ethnic minorities receive excessive punishment in endangering state security cases. The offenses of splittism and inciting splittism are almost exclusively used to punish Uyghurs, Tibetans, and, to a lesser extent, ethnic Mongolians. Dui Hua’s Political Prisoner Database (PPDB) indicates that, since 2000, over 180 ethnic minority prisoners were sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment or more severe sentences, including life imprisonment, death with reprieve, and death, for these two offenses. Two-thirds of them are Uyghurs, while the remainder are mostly Tibetans. In regard to death sentences specifically, Dui Hua’s research found that five Uyghurs were sentenced to death for splittism alone, and five Uyghurs for splittism combined with terrorism or other charges. The number of ethnic minority offenders receiving harsh sentences for splittism or inciting splittism is strikingly high compared to Han Chinese democracy activists sentenced for subversion and inciting subversion, which are also categorized under endangering state security. Dui Hua’s PPDB showed that about 50 prisoners, 37 Han and 13 others with unclear ethnicity, have received prison sentences of ten years or more since 2000 for subversion and inciting subversion.10
Essentially, the approach to respecting Uyghur autonomy has resulted in a situation in which many Han Chinese see it as preferential treatment, and Uyghur hires living and working outside the Xinjiang autonomous region are often treated as the Chinese equivalent of D.E.I. hires—an unfair categorization to be sure, but one that nevertheless exists. Although China does not treat Uyghurs or Tibetans nearly as atrociously as Western imperialists claim, there is nevertheless a complex system in which Beijing tries to be accommodating toward these ethnic groups, while simultaneously cracking down on dissidents in what may be described as a ham-handed and often inconsistent fashion, thus lending a modicum of credence to Western accusations. In short, Beijing’s need for security against radicalized Muslim extremists used by Western colonial powers to try and destabilize the country has led to a system in which heavy-handed measures, while not anywhere near on the same level as what Israel is now doing to Palestinians since 7 October 202311, nevertheless infringes on the rights of innocent Uyghurs and Tibetans whose only “crime” was to have tenuous relations to radicals or to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.
*: It should be noted, too, that Human Rights Watch has long been compromised by U.S. and Western governmental and non-governmental organizations, and used as a tool to geopolitically weaken and isolate those governments targeted for overthrow. Likewise, Radio Free Asia is a known propaganda outlet created by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency for the purposes of disseminating deliberate disinformation. As such, claims made by such organizations should always be taken with a healthy degree of skepticism pending further research.
UNDOCUMENTED PERSONS
China’s one-child policy was created in 1980 to curb the rapid growth of the population so as to preserve limited resources. As circumstances have changed, restrictions on the number of children allowed have been relaxed, but babies born prior to those relaxations have had to grow up as ‘Heihaizi’, or ‘black children’—children born to Chinese parents but not registered thereto. Often this happens when a family has a girl instead of a boy, and rather than register the child as required by law, some parents try to suppress the fact either by hiding the birth or trying to pass their daughters off as boys. One notable example is engineer Naomi Wu, who is herself unregistered and therefore considered a non-person in the eyes of the law.
Single mothers must report to local authorities, who are often corrupt and charge exorbitant fines to unwed mothers who want to register their children. This is another way in which Heihaizi fall through the cracks.12
Heihaizi do not enjoy the same rights and privileges as registered Chinese, do not have access to the same education and social services, and therefore exist largely outside the system. Heihaizi cannot inherit or own property, legally marry, or joined the armed forces. Many Heihaizi girls end up sold to brothels or used as undocumented (and therefore exploitable) factory labor.
And really, few—if any—want to even acknowledge, let alone talk about, forced sterilization and abortions as a result of the one-child policy, or the abandonment of infant girls to die of exposure because of the over-valuation of having boy infants in Chinese society.13 Chinese-born comedienne Jiaoying Summers received backlash from leftists for joking about her own near abandonment in a dumpster, from which she was rescued by her mother, but the truth is that such things were all too common under the one-child policy, and its effects still plague China even today.14
The one-child policy may have been necessary at the time of its implementation, but any such necessity ended decades ago, and those who fell through the proverbial cracks have had to suffer the consequences. As well, as Chinese society ages, higher birth rates become a necessity in order to maintain births-vs-deaths balance. A society that cannot replace its population at the same rate as its death toll is doomed to stagnation and eventual decline. That’s why the one-child policy was relaxed in 2016, and restrictions on birthrates at this point are probably more harmful than helpful. A solution that can go some way to solve the problem would be for the government to formally recognize Heihaizi, grant them automatic registration retroactively, with the full rights, privileges, and responsibilities of citizenship. China is addressing many previous societal ills, particular the once-rampant poverty that is now rapidly becoming a memory for most Chinese, but there still is a long way to go, and resolving the problem of unregistered persons is one way to move to the next level.
POLICIES TOWARD LGBTQIA PERSONS
Another accusation against China is its policy toward LGBTQIA persons, with claims typically along the lines of treating it as though it is uniquely bigoted toward non-heterosexuals and gender non-conforming people. The truth is that China is no more or less bigoted toward its Queer folk than are other nations—particularly the United States and its vassals in Europe, but also Russia, Middle Eastern and many African nations, and in Latin America. Nevertheless, it is necessary to add additional context. Advocates within China have described it as having a mixed record toward LGBTQIA rights, with significant backsliding over the past five years.
Last year, a lesbian couple was brutally murdered by a homophobe and their relationship glossed over and dismissed as “being close friends” to minimize or ignore the murders’ nature as a deliberate hate crime.15 The news story represents a chilling fact of life for Chinese who are anything but cis and heterosexual, but the truth is that even today in Western nations, especially the United States, hate crimes against LGBTQIA folk are all too common—and on the rise.16 N.A.T.O. countries such as Poland, as recently as 2020, have areas where it is legally forbidden for LGBTQIA persons to go.17 And Israel, that supposedly LGBTQIA-friendly nation, not only is slaughtering Palestinians by the thousands daily, including LGBTQIA Palestinians, forbids same-sex marriage and other rights to its non-hetero, non-cis citizens.1819
Singling China out as being unique among nations with horrible records on LGBTQIA rights is gross and dishonest, just as it is to do likewise against Russia, but that doesn’t mean that its record is necessarily better simply because Western sources hypocritically claim the opposite. For instance, while its record on LGBTQIA rights is indeed mixed, it’s actually somewhat better than in Israel, where same-sex couples have to find legal loopholes to even be allowed to marry.2021 Still, that doesn’t mean it’s better by much. In many ways, for every step forward2223 in China for LGBTQIA rights, two steps back are taken. Discrimination is still very commplace.2425 Same-sex marriage is forbidden, as in the majority of Western countries, and unless a couple has a direct blood tie to its children, for instance, one or both partners using the services of donors and surrogates to produce biological offspring of their own, same-sex couples are denied adoption rights.
It is only honest to acknowledge China’s shortcomings with regards to LGBTQIA rights, just as it is only honest to acknowledge that it is by no means alone—or even the worst—offender in that area. Beijing could stand to follow the lead of Cuba, which made headlines as a communist nation to recognize and legalize full rights for its Queer citizens.2627 But first it, and other nations, need to have serious, frank, and honest discussions about LGBTQIA people, discussions that are inclusive thereof, and this cannot be forcibly rushed. It must grow organically from a real need to question how we perceive masculinity, femininity, sex, gender, and other aspects of human sexuality. Imposing such talks only causes bigoted leaders and academics to dig in their heels further, and become increasingly irrational, hostile, and yes, violent, as their control slips away, and they are retaliating in the realm of public discussion by silencing voices opposed to their depravity (see Elon Muskrat’s stated reason for buying Twitter2829). It’s not only that bigots never needed a reason to crush dissenting voices beyond the knowledge that their diseased ideology cannot withstand public scrutiny; it’s that those who remain on the proverbial fence—who, whether or not we on the left like to admit it, outnumber those of us on either side of the ideological divide—are the primary battleground in the fight for LGBTQIA rights, and we are losing that battleground. Only by starting and amplifying genuine civil discourse can we hope to change minds. That can’t happen if we insist on singling out China and other nations targeted by the U.S. empire for overthrow. We can actually acknowledge China’s policies toward LGBTQIA and other minority groups while also admitting our own hypocrisy.
CONCLUSION
I hope that this essay will have at least gotten you, dear reader, to consider things about China you hadn’t before. Yes, we can and absolutely challenge Western propaganda, but that doesn’t mean we should turn off all critical thinking skills and ignore the very real—and often very complicated—problems China does indeed have with regards to its treatment of certain minority groups. Only by retaining and exercising our ability to think critically can we emerge more informed, not only with regards to China’s many problems, but also in terms of how we can reach out to resolve them while respecting Chinese sovereignty. No nation is perfect, and neither are the people thereof. We can honestly acknowledge the good while also honestly criticizing the bad, and work together to overcome these and other problems, both in China and in our own societies.
Zang, Xiaowei. 2016. Handbook on Ethnic Minorities in China. Edward Elgar Publishing.
“Chinese Salafism and the Saudi Connection.” n.d. Thediplomat.com. https://thediplomat.com/2014/10/chinese-salafism-and-the-saudi-connection.
Rohan Gunaratna, “Salafism in China and Its Jihadist-Takfiri Strains,” Al-Mesbar Center (Al-Mesbar Center, January 18, 2018), https://mesbar.org/salafism-china-jihadist-takfiri-strains/.
Osama Al Sharif, “Jordan and the Challenge of Salafi Jihadists,” Middle East Institute (Middle East Institute, 2018), https://mei.edu/publications/jordan-and-challenge-salafi-jihadists.
Human Rights Watch. “China: Passports Arbitrarily Recalled in Xinjiang | Human Rights Watch,” November 21, 2016. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/22/china-passports-arbitrarily-recalled-xinjiang.
Ibid.
Qiao Long et al., “Tibetans, Uyghurs ‘Blacklisted’ at Hotels in Chinese Cities,” Radio Free Asia (Central Intelligence Agency, May 14, 2015), https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/china-minorities-05142015143907.html.
Mercedes Hutton, “Destinations Known | in China, Airbnb Listings Discriminate against Uygurs and Other Ethnic Minority Groups,” South China Morning Post, May 8, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/travel/article/3009186/china-airbnb-listings-discriminate-against-uygurs.
“‘Two Restraints, One Leniency’: Part I, China’s Ethnic Minorities and Criminal Law,” Duihuahrjournal.org (Dui Hua Foundation, September 11, 2019), https://www.duihuahrjournal.org/2019/09/two-restraints-one-leniency-part-i.html.
“‘Two Restraints, One Leniency’: Part II, the Legacy of a Controversial Policy,” Duihuahrjournal.org (Dui Hua Foundation, September 19, 2019), https://www.duihuahrjournal.org/2019/09/two-restraints-one-leniency-part-ii.html.
UN news, “Rights Expert Finds ‘Reasonable Grounds’ Genocide Is Being Committed in Gaza | UN News,” news.un.org (United Nations, March 26, 2024), https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/03/1147976.
Yiying Fan, “Single Mothers Forced to Pay Fines for Giving Birth,” SixthTone, June 2016, https://www.sixthtone.com/news/946.
Andrew Mullen, “China’s 1-Child Policy: What Was It and What Impact Did It Have?,” South China Morning Post, June 1, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3135510/chinas-one-child-policy-what-was-it-and-what-impact-did-it.
Nate Jackson, “Jiaoying Summers’ Joke about China’s One-Child Policy Made Everyone Laugh — except TikTok Censors,” Los Angeles Times, January 28, 2022, https://www.latimes.com/entertainment-arts/story/2022-01-28/tiktok-china-censorship-comedian-jiaoying-summers-one-child-policy.
Amelia Hansford, “Lesbian Couple Brutally Stabbed to Death in Broad Daylight at Hong Kong Mall,” PinkNews | Latest lesbian, gay, bi and trans news | LGBTQ+ news, June 8, 2023, https://www.thepinknews.com/2023/06/08/hong-kong-lesbian-couple-double-murder/.
Delphine Luneau, “New FBI Data: Anti-LGBTQ+ Hate Crimes Continue to Spike,” Human Rights Campaign, September 23, 2024, https://www.hrc.org/press-releases/new-fbi-data-anti-lgbtq-hate-crimes-continue-to-spike-even-as-overall-crime-rate-declines.
Rob Picheta and Ivana Kottasová, “‘You Don’t Belong Here,’” CNN, October 15, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2020/10/world/lgbt-free-poland-intl-scli-cnnphotos/.
Ruth Levush, “Israel: High Court Rejects Petition to Recognize Same-Sex Marriages,” The Library of Congress, 2015, https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2017-09-11/israel-high-court-rejects-petition-to-recognize-same-sex-marriages/.
“LGBT Rights in Israel,” Equaldex, accessed October 21, 2024, https://www.equaldex.com/region/israel.
Equaldex, “LGBT Rights in China | Equaldex,” Equaldex.com, August 5, 2019, https://www.equaldex.com/region/china.
CBS News December 5, 2019, and 9:59 Am, “World of Weddings: Israeli Same-Sex Couples Find Legal Loophole for Marriage,” www.cbsnews.com, accessed October 21, 2024, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/world-of-weddings-israel-same-sex-couples-find-legal-loophole-to-recognize-marriages/.
Amy Hawkins, “Custody Ruling in Same-Sex Case Hailed as LGBTQ+ Milestone in China,” the Guardian (The Guardian, August 14, 2024), https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/aug/14/custody-ruling-in-same-sex-case-hailed-as-lgbt-milestone-in-china.
Dale Fox, “China Court Recognises Two Legal Mothers in Landmark LGBTQ+ Ruling,” Attitude, August 14, 2024, https://www.attitude.co.uk/news/world/chinese-court-recognises-two-legal-mothers-in-landmark-lgbtq-ruling-471531/.
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